

US EUCOM



Strategy of Readiness and Engagement

APRIL 1998

This *Strategy* synchronizes U.S. policy from the *National Security Strategy* of the President and the *National Military Strategy* of Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the U.S. European Command's theater strategy.

The overall security environment in Europe is better than it has been for a very long time. Precisely because the current situation is historically such an anomaly we must protect and advance these gains. Events throughout the region—sometimes in the form of armed conflict—demonstrate the challenges that could quickly reverse the remarkable progress of recent years.

Our response to the situation is a strategy of readiness and engagement. We pursue this strategy in close cooperation with our many friends and allies.

Military readiness must come first. As the *National Military Strategy* states: “The Armed Forces’ core competence is the ability to apply decisive military power to deter or defeat aggression and achieve our national security objectives.” Readiness means that we will defeat any adversary who challenges our nation militarily. Readiness also means that our forces respond quickly to control crises. Finally, readiness provides the foundation for all our engagement activities. The widespread knowledge that, when there is no other acceptable course of action, our nation will decisively respond and win a conflict, strengthens our welcome and gives a special significance to our presence.

We use presence to actively mold the security environment in peacetime—this is what is meant by “engagement.” Our aim is to reduce the conditions that lead to conflict. The Command's engagement activities have a tremendous beneficial impact promoting democratic ideals and principles, and we will continue to pursue peacetime engagement vigorously.

By swift response to the real dangers of the present, and a determined pursuit of a better future, the European Command makes an important contribution to the national security policy of the United States and to the well-being of present and future generations of Americans.

This document is authoritative guidance to the USEUCOM staff and subordinate commands. It is a strategy to improve our lives and safeguard the liberties of our allies, partners, and friends.



CINC VISION AND OBJECTIVES

A community of free, stable, and prosperous nations acting together while respecting the dignity and rights of the individual and adhering to the principles of national sovereignty and international law.

Objective 1

PROTECT AND TAKE CARE OF THE FORCE

Objective 2

MAINTAIN, SUPPORT, AND CONTRIBUTE TO THE INTEGRITY AND ADAPTATION OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

Objective 3

HELP PREPARE THE MILITARIES OF INVITED NATIONS TO INTEGRATE INTO NATO

Objective 4

PROMOTE STABILITY, DEMOCRATIZATION, MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM, AND CLOSER RELATIONSHIPS WITH NATO IN THE NATIONS OF CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE NEW INDEPENDENT STATES

Objective 5

SUPPORT U.S. EFFORTS TO ENSURE SELF-SUSTAINING PROGRESS FROM THE DAYTON PROCESS; DEVELOP MILITARY INSTITUTIONS IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA ADAPTED TO DEMOCRATIC CIVILIAN CONTROL

Objective 6

SUPPORT PEACE INITIATIVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND MAINTAIN THE U.S.-ISRAELI STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP

Objective 7

ENSURE FREEDOM OF MARITIME AND AERONAUTIC LINES OF COMMUNICATION (LOCs)

Objective 8

PROMOTE STABILITY, DEMOCRATIZATION, AND MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM IN AFRICA

Objective 9

PROVIDE PROMPT RESPONSE TO HUMANITARIAN CRISIS

Objective 10

MAINTAIN A HIGH STATE OF READINESS IN USEUCOM FORCES

Objective 11

IMPLEMENT *JOINT VISION 2010*

THEATER STRATEGY




TABLE OF CONTENTS

Executive Summary.....	6
I. Introduction.	7
II. Quality Force.....	8
III. USEUCOM Strategic Environment	10
Western Europe and NATO	11
Central Europe.....	12
New Independent States	13
Middle East North Africa	13
Sub-Saharan Africa	14
IV. Objectives.	16
V. Elements of the USEUCOM Strategy.....	23
Introduction	23
Shape	24
Respond	29
Prepare.....	32
Strategic Concepts	34
VI Resources.....	36
Introduction	36
Forces	36
Funding.....	38
Infrastructure.....	39

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This Strategy explains how CINCEUR applies guidance from the National Command Authorities, as expressed by the National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Military Strategy (NMS), to the United States European Command's (USEUCOM's) Area of Responsibility (AOR). It is his basic approach to achieving U.S. national objectives in the USEUCOM theater.

USEUCOM, one of five U.S. geographic unified commands, encompasses major portions of Europe, Africa and the Middle East — an area of over 13 million square miles, and home for more than a billion people. The people and their institutions in this AOR represent the widest possible differences in prosperity, stability, politics, religion, and attitude towards the United States. The overall security trend is positive throughout the AOR. But the USEUCOM theater is one of diversity, conflict, and change, so that there are areas that pose significant dangers both to continued progress and, ultimately, to the vital interests of the U.S.

The CINC has established eleven regional objectives based on the two overarching objectives of the National Military Strategy—promote peace and stability, and defeat adversaries. The eleven objectives represent the ends or goals we are trying to achieve and guide both our maintenance of readiness and our engagement efforts.

The elements of the strategy are the ways in which we intend to achieve the objectives. In all five regions of the AOR we shape the environment to consolidate gains already made and to continue and accelerate progress. We respond to dangers as directed by the National Command Authorities to limit and ultimately eliminate the threat they pose, and to resume development in a positive direction. And we prepare for an uncertain future both by implementing Joint Vision 2010, and by participating actively in the national-level project of developing new doctrine, organizations, and equipment.

Our resources are primarily of three sorts: forces, funding, and infrastructure. They are interdependent, and no two of them are effective without adequate amounts of the third. All of our activities depend on our using a less tangible resource of inestimable value: the trust and confidence that we enjoy with most of the nations and peoples of this AOR.

I. INTRODUCTION

This *Strategy* explains how CINCEUR applies guidance from the National Command Authorities to achieve U.S. national objectives in the United States European Command (USEUCOM) theater.

USEUCOM, one of five U.S. geographic unified commands, encompasses major portions of Europe, Africa and the Middle East — an area of over 13 million square miles, and home for more than a billion people. The people and their institutions in this Area of Responsibility (AOR) represent the widest possible differences in prosperity, stability, politics, religion, and attitude towards the United States.

Events far beyond the formal borders of the command influence the AOR; hence our Area of Interest (AOI) is larger than the command itself. Likewise, occurrences within the command often have a decisive impact elsewhere, making close coordination with other unified commands and the Joint Staff imperative as we work together to achieve U.S. national interests.

The *National Military Strategy*, derived from the *President's National Security Strategy*, provides the framework for this process and for the USEUCOM strategy. *Joint Vision 2010* (JV2010) provides its conceptual template. Many of the concepts of the *Quadrennial Defense Review* are incorporated. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, the Unified Command Plan, Joint Publication (JP) 0-2, *Unified Actions Armed Forces*, and Joint Publication 1, *Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces*, and their subordinate publications furnish operational guidance.

Using national policy as a framework, this document describes the theater environment and explains the command's strategic objectives (ends), the strategic elements it will use to achieve those objectives (ways), and the resources required to implement those strategic elements (means). It begins this explanation by describing how we protect and take care of the force because quality personnel are essential to everything we accomplish for the nation.



II. QUALITY FORCE

USEUCOM's people—their dedication, their determination, their abilities—are the foundation of this strategy.

Of all USEUCOM's diverse military assets, there is none more important or more impressive than the service members and civilians who constitute the command. From the frigid Balkan winter to the oppressive heat of equatorial Africa, these Americans have proven themselves fully equal to the difficult and dangerous mission of serving their nation's vital interests far from home. Their dignity, their pride in themselves and in what they stand for, their respect for others, and their durable optimism, give a special quality to their unmatched military professionalism. Their contribution will continue to be essential to USEUCOM's mission accomplishment. As JV2010 affirms, "The judgment, creativity, and fortitude of our people will remain the key to success in future joint operations."

The USEUCOM environment tolerates no compromises on basic service competencies; above all, it allows no compromises on leadership. USEUCOM training, whether service-oriented, joint, or combined, is demanding and relentless, designed to instill both the competence and the leadership required to master the complex operational challenges found throughout the theater. From the senior officer who has already been through decades of development, training, and rigorous selection, to the new member of the command, fresh from his initial training, all members of USEUCOM advance their leadership development while honing their operational skills.

The USEUCOM environment also mandates an extremely effective force protection program. Force protection must be directed against the full range of threats: from disease—now as throughout history a major threat to any deployed force—to terrorism. The unique global position of the United States has made combating terrorism particularly urgent. Denied any hope of mounting a successful frontal challenge to U.S. power—even regionally—adversaries may be tempted to resort to terrorism as the most effective asymmetric challenge available. For this reason, force protection is our highest priority at every level: from our regular forces, to non-combatant military activities such as Attaches and Security Assistance Organizations, to family members.

A high quality of life for our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines is both an objective and a strategy. It is an objective, because our Service members, who bring talent and commitment to the nation far out of proportion to the monetary recompense we offer, have earned our gratitude, our respect, and a decent standard of living. It is a strategy because it helps maintain our most important asset, the quality of the force. USEUCOM service members will do their best regardless of

-

the standard of living we offer them and their families. But if we continually put their families in an environment of inadequate housing, inaccessible medical support, and insufficient day care, they will leave when they have fulfilled their commitment. And, as the word spreads back home, their younger counterparts will be discouraged from volunteering to serve. Quality of life sustains the quality force.



III. USEUCOM STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

The USEUCOM area of responsibility (AOR) exhibits the full range of human conditions, and the strategic environment is correspondingly diverse. Nevertheless, all regions of the AOR share some important characteristics.

Most saliently, U.S. long-term commitment and engagement is a fact that permeates and modifies virtually all security matters here. A substantial change in our commitment would have far-reaching effects; a failure of our leadership would have revolutionary—and almost certainly negative—consequences.

In most cases our presence is welcome and is maintained on a bilateral and usually multilateral basis. Our presence thus becomes the agent of an effective international consensus, although we retain the ability and insist on the right to act unilaterally. The far-reaching net of relationships we have developed and maintain does much to prevent conflict, and forms a foundation for our leadership when collective action is necessary.

Unfortunately, many of the technological factors which make our presence pervasive also facilitate the spread of influences much less benign. The global revolution in business affairs, for example, has been accompanied by a parallel and malignant revolution in criminal affairs. Little impeded by national boundaries, transnational crime settles in areas congenial to it and reaches out across continents. This development concerns USEUCOM because military institutions can be corrupted by, or even serve as a host to, criminal organizations; because such organizations do devastating damage to new democracies; and because criminal profits can be used to finance military operations which damage regional security.

Technological advance also increasingly brings weapons of mass destruction (WMD) within reach of many state and non-state actors. The end of the Cold War, and our success in operationalizing leading edge technology, has made it extremely difficult for even large regional powers to confront U.S. conventional superiority frontally. But WMD, particularly when combined with modern delivery systems, offer the possibility of a potent asymmetric challenge, and adversaries and potential adversaries are seeking them actively.

The techniques of terrorism were perfected by state agents during the Cold War; they are widely understood today and are directed, often with significant effect, against national governments. In addition to destabilizing societies and governments, terrorism presents USEUCOM with difficult force protection issues.

Although no one wants environmental degradation and scarcity, both are significant in the AOR and both can lead to confrontation and conflict. In the past, particularly in some regions, military institutions have played a very significant role in increasing these problems. Militaries can help by limiting the environmental damage they do; more dramatically, they play a key role in responses to environmental disaster. Environmental cooperation can build democracy, trust, understanding, and may avoid costly military interventions.

Ultimately, the enemy is instability. As a result, the challenges we face here, and their solutions, consistently cross organizational lines; most of them, if they are to be solved at all, will be solved by multiple agencies, of which USEUCOM is only one. Our primary mission remains the creation of military conditions directed by the National Command Authorities. But the desired end state is rarely defined in purely military terms. We make a deliberate effort to coordinate our activities with other government agencies, particularly the State Department.

These common characteristics are important, but the nations of the USEUCOM AOR also enjoy a very high degree of autonomy, and display the highest degree of diversity in their demographic, ethnic, political, military, economic, and geographic characteristics. At the most detailed planning level, USEUCOM manages its engagement programs on a country-by-country basis. Here, it suffices to divide our area of responsibility into five regions:

Western Europe and NATO

Central Europe

The New Independent States

The Middle East and North Africa

Sub-Saharan Africa

WESTERN EUROPE AND NATO

The nations of NATO and the friendly democratic neutrals of Western Europe are in themselves vital to U.S. national interests. They also enable American involvement throughout the rest of the AOR and our power projection capabilities beyond it. For security, economic, political, cultural, and historical reasons, the nations of the region are our natural allies. To that affinity is added, in many cases, the common experience of nearly fifty years' partnership in NATO, the most successful alliance in modern history.

Western Europe is a region of stable democracies and great economic prosperity, not the least because of its successful partnership with the U.S. Both its population and gross domestic product are larger than those of the United States. Its infrastructure rivals that of any other part of the world. The evolution of its economic, political, and military institutions is furthering the development of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) that will increase European capability for coordinated collective action. This is another form of cooperation within NATO, and NATO remains the cornerstone of European security. All forms of U.S. national power are amplified by our relationship to NATO and to the nations of this region.

At the same time, new and challenging issues have arisen. In an incomparably more open international order, conflicts in adjacent regions impact directly and indirectly on both security and prosperity. They will require responses that strain existing regional institutions. Some nations have shouldered a heavy burden of refugees from these conflicts. Surviving ties to nations that formerly were colonies cause costly entanglement in the crises accompanying the evolution of sub-Saharan Africa. Wealth in Western Europe has drawn immigrants whose long-term status is not easily clarified.

As we recognize the great contribution Western Europe and NATO make to our national security, we must also clearly see the profound change in the security environment. The discipline imposed by global confrontation is gone. The consensus which has proved so beneficial in the past has been maintained—but it is no longer externally enforced. The range of possible political outcomes has become broader; continued US engagement is necessary to ensure the vital trans-Atlantic link continues to serve our mutual interests.

CENTRAL EUROPE

The nations of Central Europe transcended a difficult and tragic history with one of the most remarkable revolutions in modern history. Now, in the midst of fundamental social, economic, political, and military changes, they are forging a security environment of stability, openness, and fairness without precedent in this region.

Arms control agreements provide transparency and confidence in military matters, while the Council on Security and Cooperation in Europe offers formal mechanisms for conflict resolution. Even more importantly, relationships with NATO have developed into an array of arrangements tailored to each individual country, ranging from intense accession programs to low-key participation in an occasional PfP event. All of these arrangements formalize participating countries' relationship with NATO, provide access to an effective forum for conflict resolution, and offer a degree of real security. The remarkable process that brought the region this far is continuing, and we look forward to both the strengthening of PfP relationships, and invitations to additional countries to become full NATO members.

The picture, unfortunately, is not uniformly positive across the region. With the participation of many of the Partners, NATO implemented the Dayton Peace Accords in Former Yugoslavia, but the process of establishing institutions and habits that can guarantee an enduring and self-sustaining peace is advancing only slowly. In Albania, a whole array of societal and governmental institutions—including the military—failed suddenly and catastrophically. Elsewhere, democratic institutions are under attack—both overtly and covertly. Throughout the region, a literally poisonous environmental legacy continues to damage both economies and quality of life. Such conditions do not obviate the tremendous progress made over the last years, but they do require active and perceptive attention by USEUCOM and other

U.S. government agencies—the successful continuance of this process is fundamental to the vital interests of the United States and the well-being of the peoples of the region.

NEW INDEPENDENT STATES

The New Independent States (NIS), the new nations that used to be parts of the former Soviet Union, form a vast region of more than 100 million people. USEUCOM has responsibility for some aspects of U.S. military relations and activities with six of these states: Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia.

With their unexpected emergence as sovereign nations, the NIS simultaneously changed their institutions from authoritarian to democratic, and from provincial to national. Some have successfully taken their place on the world stage as democracies; some have tended to revert to authoritarianism and dependence; many are riven by severe ethnic divisions. Most have shown a degree of openness to ideas about military professionalism and the subordination of military institutions to democratic decision making.

The challenges to the formation of viable national institutions and to democratization will remain severe over the near- to mid- term, and relations with Russia will continue to be a central and difficult theme of these nations' foreign policy. Nevertheless, their sincere interest in closer relationships with western institutions will provide USEUCOM the opportunity to make significant contributions to their development.

MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

This primarily maritime region on NATO's southern flank is vitally important to the United States and our European allies. The strategic importance of the commercial and military lines of communication (LOC) through the region and our enduring political commitment in the region require a very significant presence, which we maintain primarily with the routinely rotating forces of the 6th Fleet.

A daunting array of intransigent conflicts, both old and new; vast quantities of advanced conventional weapons; significant arsenals of WMD; and rising demographic, economic, and environmental pressures form an explosive mixture here. Several nations in this region that are unfriendly to the U.S. also have the technological and financial resources to develop and employ WMD; several have sponsored terrorism in the past and are at least ambivalent towards it today. Because many regimes rest on a personal rather than an institutional basis, succession issues

can have a large and unpredictable effect.

U.S. engagement has allowed the Middle East Peace Process to continue. Our naval presence and freedom of navigation operations ensure that the LOCs remain open to international commerce. We enjoy strong and friendly bilateral relations with many nations in the region, and these bilateral relationships produce significant mutual benefit. New strategic relationships are developing. Effective regional organizations are lacking, however, and their absence complicates the coordination of policy among our friends and allies. Enduring improvement of the overall situation requires determined cooperation at both the national and international levels.

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

The thirty-five countries in USEUCOM's AOR south of the Sahara are threatened by a complex of historical, environmental, demographic, economic, and political challenges. Colonialism and the surrogate conflicts of the Cold War both belong to the past, but the damages they caused are very much part of the present. The health, geographical, and climatic characteristics of much of the region combine to form an environment uniquely hostile to the development of modern economies, societal institutions, and governments. The combination of extremely high adult mortality and even higher birth rates has resulted in an extraordinarily low median age, with much of the younger population deprived of adequate adult support. The ultimate effect in many areas has been slow economic growth, political chaos, and in the most severe instances, the failure of both civil society and government.

We anticipate that we will continue to be called upon to conduct Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEOs) in countries where disorder threatens American citizens, and humanitarian operations where the scale and urgency of human catastrophe is such that only military capabilities can be mobilized fast enough to prevent a massive loss of life.

These operations will not normally be undertaken in isolation, however. An extraordinary and highly capable *de facto* network of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs) has proven capable of providing vast amounts of humanitarian assistance with little outside help. Furthermore, just as we have helped many third country nationals in NEO situations, the militaries of other nations have helped Americans. NEO operations are always executed in a multinational environment, and require intense international coordination both before and during operations to ensure that this is an advantage and not an invitation to disaster.

Humanitarian relief and NEO operations, however, are stop-gap operations conducted to prevent the worst effects of situations that we would have preferred to prevent. Although there are many such situations, we must also recognize that the majority of African nations have succeeded in building functioning multi-ethnic

governments and societies. There are also indications of increasing regional and sub-regional awareness, shown by the growth of African institutions, such as the regional Organization of African Unity (OAU), or sub-regional Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Southern African Development Community (SADC), and Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD), to meet African challenges. Fundamental improvement in the African situation can only be achieved over a period of years or decades, but as it is made, the frequency of crisis will decline and the rate of improvement will accelerate.



IV. OBJECTIVES

OVERVIEW

The objectives which follow are the CINC's regionalization of national security objectives as expressed in the President's *National Security Strategy* (NSS), the *Quadrennial Defense Review* of the Secretary of Defense, and the *National Military Strategy* (NMS) of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. They are best understood in the context of USEUCOM's overall mission:

USEUCOM is a unified combatant command whose mission is to maintain ready forces to conduct the full spectrum of military operations unilaterally or in concert with coalition partners; to enhance transatlantic security through support of NATO; to promote regional stability; and to advance U.S. interests in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East.

The President's *National Security Strategy* states that our national "three core objectives" are to:

Enhance our security with effective diplomacy and with military forces that are ready to fight and win;

Bolster America's economic prosperity;

Promote democracy abroad.

USEUCOM's activities support all three of these objectives. Our responsibilities lie primarily in the area of the first objective; we have a very important role to play in the third however; and our success in both will have a large, although indirect, impact on the second.


The Chairman's *National Military Strategy* (NMS) derives from the NSS that:

our national military objectives are to **Promote Peace and Stability** and, where necessary, to **Defeat Adversaries** that threaten the United States, our interests, or our allies.

In formulating his objectives from this guidance, the CINC purposely made them broad, and focused only on the overall objectives for each region. A complete listing of every conceivable objective would be both unmanageably long and detrimental as well, since it would deprive subordinate commands of the latitude to exploit fully the opportunities they see best at their level.

Finally, these objectives are evolutionary. National strategy has shown great constancy of purpose over the years, but its success in this dynamic AOR means that regional objectives must develop to remain relevant. Just as these

objectives represent an evolution from those of the preceding USEUCOM Strategy, they will in their turn be succeeded in the future by new ones.



Objective 1

PROTECT AND TAKE CARE OF THE FORCE

Numerous terrorist and criminal organizations exploit the USEUCOM Area of Responsibility and adjacent regions as a base. Many of them are capable of targeting service members, facilities, and even family members. Readiness requires us to maintain a high level of security through our own measures and through cooperation with host nation authorities. Force protection is a prerequisite for enduring success, and it is the CINC’s number one priority.

A high quality of life for our service members, who have volunteered to serve their nation, is an end worthy of achieving in itself. It is also key to maintaining the quality of our force, which is a precondition for successfully conducting all our other activities.

Objective 2

MAINTAIN, SUPPORT, AND CONTRIBUTE TO THE INTEGRITY AND ADAPTATION OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

Today NATO creates a stable security environment in Europe. Its vigorous response to the fundamentals of the current European security situation, and its ability to perform new missions, create the foundations for a stable future. NATO is still a defensive alliance, but NATO Enlargement, Enhanced PfP, and chartered relationships with Russia and Ukraine have made it the centerpiece of an inclusive mutual security arrangement as well. Regionally integrated U.S. military presence as a part of NATO makes both roles possible. Military presence also underlies our influence in one of the most wealthy and powerful regions of the world, and produces a significant proportion of our power projection capability both to other parts of the USEUCOM AOR and to CENTCOM. A viable NATO protects Europeans and Americans alike against the dangers of the renationalization of security policies. It simultaneously generates the confidence, trust, and stability that underlie the political and economic vitality enjoyed by the North Atlantic Community since the end of the Second World War.

Objective 3

HELP PREPARE THE MILITARIES OF INVITED NATIONS TO INTEGRATE INTO NATO

As part of the on-going process of NATO external adaptation, the July 1997 NATO Summit invited three nations to begin accession talks and explicitly left open the door to further enlargement. Article 10 of the NATO Charter stipulates that new members must “be in a position to further the security of the North Atlantic area.” This requires militaries under civilian control with a high degree of professionalism, capability, and interoperability with NATO forces. USEUCOM will conduct exercises, manage security assistance, and pursue other appropriate programs to assist invited nations achieve the desired standard.

Objective 4

PROMOTE STABILITY, DEMOCRATIZATION, MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM, AND CLOSER RELATIONSHIPS WITH NATO IN THE NATIONS OF CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE NEW INDEPENDENT STATES

The nations of Central Europe and the New Independent States are moving with determination toward integration in regional structures. As part of this process, their relationships with NATO develop in different ways: for some, toward full Alliance membership; for others, toward extremely close association with the Alliance through Enhanced PfP or specially chartered relationships; and for others still, toward relatively low-key participation in a few Partnership activities. All such relationships contribute to regional stability, and reduce participants' defense costs by placing national security on an international foundation. This very positive development in external relationships requires a far-reaching parallel modification of internal institutions. Through active engagement with the militaries of the nations of the region, USEUCOM supports such modification—developing professionalism; showing how the US integrates military organizations into democratic institutions; and helping to create a cadre of security managers with international experience, broad understanding of security issues, and appreciation for environmental issues.

Objective 5

SUPPORT U.S. EFFORTS TO ENSURE SELF- SUSTAINING PROGRESS FROM THE DAYTON PROCESS; DEVELOP MILITARY INSTITUTIONS IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA ADAPTED TO DEMOCRATIC CIVILIAN CONTROL

NATO's success in implementing the military provisions of the Dayton Peace Accords (DPA) was the first step toward establishing a stable and just peace in the region. USEUCOM will act as directed by the National Command Authorities to preserve the military achievements while a self-sustaining peace develops. It will make a direct contribution to the growth of the institutions necessary for such a peace by actively engaging to develop military organizations that are professional disciplined, subject to civilian control, and well adapted to the needs of democracy.

Objective 6

SUPPORT PEACE INITIATIVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND MAINTAIN THE U.S.-ISRAELI STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP

The deeply-rooted conflicts in this region will be resolved through patience and persistence over the long term. Resolute U.S. engagement has already helped nations in the region achieve significant progress toward lasting peace. USEUCOM provides the capabilities for a broad spectrum of possible U.S. actions and maintains the military aspects of the U.S.-Israeli strategic relationship. It is in our interest, and in the interests of the nations and peoples involved, that progress toward peace continue without resort to armed force, the threat of armed force, or terrorism.

Objective 7

ENSURE FREEDOM OF MARITIME AND AERONAUTIC LINES OF COMMUNICATION (LOCs)

Lines of communication in the USEUCOM AOR contribute to prosperity and stability here and in the U.S. itself. They support response in a wide range of situations. The presence of large quantities of technologically advanced weaponry in the Mediterranean has made those crucial LOCs even more vulnerable than they historically have been.

Objective 8

PROMOTE STABILITY, DEMOCRATIZATION, AND MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM IN AFRICA

Military establishments are a necessary part of a modern state, but they can easily become destructive. The beleaguered nations of sub-Saharan Africa cannot afford the costs of inefficient militaries or the injustice and hardships imposed by undisciplined ones. USEUCOM will work with the key militaries of this region to develop professionalism and discipline, build the institutions and organizations that over the long term support democratic civilian control, and assist the armed forces to become the guarantors of public safety. USEUCOM actively supports initiatives such as the African Crisis Response Initiative designed to encourage regional, long-range approaches to sub-Saharan security. We are working toward regional and sub-regional self-sufficiency in peace-keeping and humanitarian relief operations.

Objective 9

PROVIDE PROMPT RESPONSE TO HUMANITARIAN CRISIS

Large humanitarian crises are possible in many places in the AOR and are likely to continue in sub-Saharan Africa for the foreseeable future. Sometimes the scale and nature of the crisis and the urgency of the need mean that only military capabilities can prevent widespread loss of life. When directed by the NCA, USEUCOM responds to stabilize such situations while assisting other agencies to mobilize and take over the mission.

Objective 10

MAINTAIN A HIGH STATE OF READINESS IN USEUCOM FORCES

Objective 10 is met by accomplishing the following sub-objectives:

MAINTAIN THE ABILITY TO FIGHT AND WIN DECISIVELY

PRESERVE CRISIS RESPONSE CAPABILITY

PROVIDE JOINT RECEPTION, STAGING, ONWARD MOVEMENT, AND INTEGRATION OF FORCES

USEUCOM's ability to apply decisive military power anywhere in the AOR is the primary reason for its existence and the foundation of all its other activities.

USEUCOM will:

MAINTAIN THE ABILITY TO FIGHT AND WIN DECISIVELY: Implementing US security policy in a theater as large, diverse, and full of confrontation as USEUCOM's can require prompt conduct of mid-intensity combat operations, even when the conflict has not been foreseen. Our readiness, and the widespread recognition of our readiness, are the hallmarks of credible presence and a prerequisite for deterring or solving crises at a low level of violence. Implementation of JV2010 strategic concepts will ensure USEUCOM's full-spectrum dominance in any contingency. Continued engagement with our allies produces interoperability and leverages combat capability.

PRESERVE CRISIS RESPONSE CAPABILITY: USEUCOM must be able to conduct the full range of crisis response operations on short notice throughout the AOR. We have frequently conducted multiple missions simultaneously. Regardless of the operational tempo, we plan for the rapid disengagement of forces for combat missions, should that be necessary.

PROVIDE JOINT RECEPTION, STAGING, ONWARD MOVEMENT, AND INTEGRATION OF FORCES: U.S. and NATO infrastructure in Western Europe, both for training and for transportation, is an indispensable part of our ability to fight in the AOR and support power projection capabilities to other unified commands. Interoperability in the logistics process both enhances capabilities and reduces costs by leveraging assets. Respect for the host nation and the environment are central to ensuring continued access to air, land, and water resources necessary to accomplish the mission.

Objective 11

IMPLEMENT *JOINT VISION 2010*

As a unified command, USEUCOM has long recognized conducting joint operations as a “core competency.” *Joint Vision 2010* (JV2010), and its companion, *Concept for Future Joint Operations*, provide the conceptual template for the way joint operations will be conducted in the future. USEUCOM participates actively in concept development, implementation, assessment, and integration. As a combatant command, USEUCOM can contribute uniquely to the development and refinement of JV2010 concepts, and to the assessment of its doctrine, organizational implications, and technology. JV2010 influences our future warfighting requirements, focuses technological development, and insures the interoperability of our forces.

JV2010 implementation is evolutionary; where opportunity exists or can be created, we will apply it in our daily operations.



V. ELEMENTS OF THE USEUCOM STRATEGY

INTRODUCTION

The President's *National Security Strategy* describes the utilization of multiple forms of U.S. national power in terms of the strategic elements of **shape**, **respond**, and **prepare**; the *National Military Strategy* of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, uses those same categories to describe military activities at the national level. This strategy applies them to USEUCOM's activities in the unique conditions of our Area of Responsibility.

We **shape** the international environment by fostering the development of individuals, institutions, nations, and international relationships to reduce the likelihood of conflict, and to deter aggression and coercion. Over the long term, this activity produces more benefit for dollar than any activity we undertake. We **respond** to the full spectrum of crisis, taking action in accordance with the National Command Authorities' direction to frustrate coercion and defeat aggression at any intensity of conflict—from response to a situation created by transnational threats, through the myriad forms of smaller-scale contingencies, to major theater war. Implementation of this element fundamentally changes the security environment in the short term. And we **prepare** for an uncertain future by identifying those additional capabilities that would contribute most to mission accomplishment, and by both developing and implementing *Joint Vision 2010* concepts. This preparation ensures we will continue to enjoy the military superiority we have today.

In implementing our strategy, we work in concert with our allies and friends. The discipline imposed by the need to build agreement usually improves our policy, and serious contact with the views of others deepens our understanding. When we reach policy implementation, the participation of others amplifies our power.

In all cases, though, an international leader is required, and that role most often falls to the United States. To lead effectively, we must both express clearly a vision of what is to be achieved, and provide our share of the resources required. Often we will be acting energetically at the vanguard of a common policy. However, we maintain the capability, and insist on the right, to act unilaterally, as do other sovereign nations.

The following text describes our activities that **shape** the AOR separately for each individual region; it treats our **respond** and **prepare** activities once for the entire theater.

SHAPE

USEUCOM *shapes* the international environment by strengthening the factors that promote stability, preventing or reducing conflicts or threats, and conducting deterrence operations in peacetime. These peacetime activities aim to prevent armed conflict and reduce the conditions that lead to it; they also create conditions that contribute greatly to our ability to *respond*.

We promote stability by influencing individuals, institutions, nations, and international agencies in ways that reduce the likelihood that the conditions of conflict will arise in the first place. We use arms control and other confidence-building measures to reduce the chance of conflict and limit the damage it might cause. Such activities are by their nature cooperative, planned long in advance, and undertaken with the active support of all parties involved. For this process to succeed, we must coordinate deliberately with other agencies of the U.S. government, the governments of other nations, NGOs, and the host nations themselves. Failure to do so squanders resources and can overwhelm the host.

USEUCOM also shapes the environment by influencing potential aggressors. The known readiness and capability of the forces we have in the region, including nuclear forces, are a convincing demonstration of our nation's ability and intention to defeat adversaries. Our power projection capabilities leave no doubt that we can bring global resources to bear unilaterally. Our network of alliances and friendships warns any potential aggressor that he can expect to be confronted not just by the United States, but by the formidable additional capabilities of a large coalition.

The following sections discuss shaping activities in each of the five regions of the AOR. The main principles we follow are printed in CAPITAL LETTERS.



Western Europe and NATO

American presence in Western Europe and NATO sustains our presence and our policies in the rest of the AOR. Even though we have enjoyed over fifty years of military, economic, and diplomatic benefits from our cooperation with the countries in this region, we do not take it for granted. We conduct many shaping activities designed to do our part to keep this centrally important relationship strong and effective. The relationship itself is an important component of our engagement with other regions, where we conduct many of our most effective activities multilaterally with our West European friends and allies. Building the relationship is a shaping activity, but it greatly strengthens our ability to *respond*. NATO stands at the center of our cooperation with this region and is its foundation, but we conduct numerous bi- and multi-lateral military activities with West European nations as well.

STRENGTHEN NATO: NATO is the formal political and military organization that embodies the very strong informal community of interest that we have with our traditional European allies. We will continue to strengthen NATO by: carrying through the military aspects of NATO enlargement; encouraging the appropriate evolution of its command and control structure; providing our fair share of its military forces; supporting the NATO Security Investment Program; participating in all aspects of NATO operations; and making NATO our agency of choice for all shaping activities in this region. We support NATO as the prime organization through which all member nations conduct their military outreach to Central Europe and the New Independent States. We see Partnership for Peace as a central and permanent part of the European security architecture completing, in conjunction with the chartered relationships with Ukraine and Russia, a continent-wide mutual security organization. Because its military capabilities are unique for an international organization, NATO's cooperation with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the UN is an important contribution to stability outside of NATO territory.

MAINTAIN BILATERAL INTERACTION WITH FRIENDLY DEMOCRATIC NEUTRALS IN THE REGION: These countries, although formally neutral, have close ties with the U.S. and we will continue to work to intensify the interchange on the military level. PfP has brought many of these nations closer to NATO and opened the way for more intense multilateral and bilateral relationships, a process which we encourage.

MAINTAIN A NETWORK OF BASES THAT CAN SUPPORT POWER PROJECTION TO AND BEYOND THE REGION: These bases are critical enablers for our ability to *respond*, both in our area of responsibility and in CENTCOM's. Establishing these bases, maintaining them, and deploying to them, however, are all activities that strengthen the effects of our presence and produce beneficial interaction with host nations.

COOPERATE ON MATERIEL DEVELOPMENT, ACQUISITION, AND MAINTENANCE: Because technological and industrial capabilities are similar, Western Europe and the U.S. cooperate on the development, acquisition, and maintenance of military materiel through defense cooperation agreements and security assistance programs. These programs offer economies of scale, enhance interoperability, and bring all parties closer to one another. USEUCOM executes many of these programs for the Department of State and for the Department of Defense; in all cases we pursue the programs vigorously, because they promote security through enhanced cooperation.

Central Europe

Our shaping activities in Central Europe adapt to the wide range of conditions found in the region. In some areas, the extraordinary success of democratic societies, institutions, and governments illustrates the power of the ideas which inspired the revolutions beginning in 1989. It has led to NATO's extending invitations to three nations to begin accession talks. In some other areas, extreme difficulties remind us how radical those revolutions were. These difficulties warn that the failure of the democratic revolutions in this region could have powerful negative consequences reaching ultimately even the United States. Some have required costly NATO deployments. The fact that many nations from this region have committed their own servicemembers to these deployments, and have made their territory and infrastructure available to NATO forces, testifies to the strength of cooperation that has already developed.

CONDUCT ACTIVITIES WITH ACCESSION NATIONS THAT HELP PREPARE THEM FOR FULL NATO MEMBERSHIP. Article 10 of NATO's Atlantic Charter establishes being „in a position to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area“ as a criterion for membership. Only a credible military capability and a high degree of interoperability with NATO forces can meet this criterion. USEUCOM will conduct extensive exercises and other activities with accession countries to help them meet these standards, primarily in a formal NATO context, but also on a bilateral and multilateral basis. Where possible, we will use advanced training technologies to enhance training effect and control costs.

SUPPORT NATO OPERATIONS: In Bosnia, NATO has engaged to implement the Dayton Peace Accords and stabilize the region. USEUCOM is a major force provider for these efforts and contributes significant planning resources as well. As self-sustaining peace has begun to develop, we have launched shaping activities that, elsewhere in Central Europe, helped individuals and institutions develop the capabilities that will contribute most to a self-sustaining peace. We are prepared to play similar roles should other NATO operations occur.

STRENGTHEN PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE: A close and constructive relationship with NATO can occur without membership, either as a prelude to an invitation to join the Alliance or as a means of creating security benefits without membership implications. By participating energetically in PfP, USEUCOM develops common standards, procedures, and doctrine with new Partners; we give substance to their relationship with NATO by building military capabilities and creating a degree of real security. We participate in PfP exercises, and in exercises with Partners In the Spirit of (ISO) PfP, to the extent that the Partners desire this activity and our own resources allow. We have already demonstrated a degree of functional interoperability, and we are eager to move farther. PfP has done much in this region to create the conditions of mutual security in an environment of military sufficiency and transparency.

PURSUE OPPORTUNITIES FOR BILATERAL MILITARY CONTACT: Bilateral activities undertaken ISO PfP and in pursuit of partnership goals continue to produce significant progress. The USEUCOM Joint Contact Team Program, the George C. Marshall Center for European Security Studies, some bilateral and multilateral exercises, and environmental cooperative initiatives are strategic activities that fall into this category. These engagement activities give Partners the opportunity for contact with our military system and perhaps equally important, the chance to know Americans on an individual basis. As the Partners evolve, more traditional forms of security assistance will likely come increasingly into play, as will other forms of defense cooperation currently conducted among NATO members.

CONTINUE ARMS CONTROL: The arms control process we have today is a result of agreements often reached by parties in an adversarial relationship. Implementation and adaptation of these agreements still furthers military sufficiency and transparency. They also keep those agreements viable for use should international relationships, against our hopes, expectations, and best efforts, once again become adversarial.

New Independent States

USEUCOM's role with these nations is still evolving but will follow lines similar to our shaping activities in Central Europe. We will strengthen PfP, pursue activities for bilateral military contact events, and continue arms control in accordance with our national interest and the desires of the nations themselves.

Our activities will show due regard for the fact that these countries are in the midst of building national institutions. Because the designation „New Independent States“ covers a vast region of great diversity, our approaches to the various sub-regions will be varied.

Middle East and North Africa

Unlike Europe, this region lacks the influence of a powerful international organization that gives multinational support to our shaping activities. We have a strategic partnership with Israel, however, and enjoy excellent bilateral relations with other nations. Our actions aim to preserve and strengthen these relationships and to ensure that the important lines of communication in this region remain open.

MAINTAIN AMERICAN PRESENCE THROUGH PERIODIC FORCE DEPLOYMENTS AND PREPOSITIONED MATERIEL: In most cases, permanent stationing of American forces in this region is difficult, but we underline both our will and our ability to protect our interests by routine rotational force deployments, freedom of navigation operations, and bilateral and multinational exercises. Prepositioned materiel simplifies and speeds logistics during crisis response. Freedom of navigation exercises demonstrate our determination to preserve our right of passage in international waters and help protect our interests in a region particularly threatened by terrorism, WMD, and modern delivery systems. Our actions convey our enduring commitment to the region and to the Middle East peace process.

CONDUCT DEFENSE COOPERATION IN ARMAMENTS: The coincidence of a serious WMD threat and the availability of world-class defensive technology gives us a unique opportunity to apply current defensive capability and cooperate in the development of new defensive means. The result is enhancement of our ability to provide full dimensional protection for our forces and our allies. USEUCOM serves as DoD's executive agent for these programs.

ENCOURAGE MILITARY TRANSPARENCY: Although intentions can be virtually impossible to gauge, capability assessments can be made with a degree of accuracy. Confidence that one nation cannot conduct a surprise attack on another facilitates meaningful discussions on the resolution of potential conflicts. When nations cooperate with one another in making such assessments, or even better, agree on some form of arms control, they lay the basis for a peaceful interaction that can reduce and ultimately eliminate conflicts that threaten peace. USEUCOM will continue to promote such cooperation. Transparency is an essential ingredient in the Middle East Peace Process.

Sub-Saharan Africa

This is an isolated region, and we have relatively limited resources available for shaping activities to deal with its large problems. As a consequence, USEUCOM seeks to amplify positive trends originating from within and to develop institutions that can survive over the long term to make a lasting contribution.

ALLOCATE RESOURCES TO FOSTER THE DEVELOPMENT OF REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS WITH LONG-TERM IMPACT: We systematically allocate our resources and efforts where we think they can make the most difference. Experience has shown that we do this best by strengthening and enabling nations and institutions that have demonstrated their own viability and their ability to make a positive impact. We are also investigating establishing types of institutions similar to those which have had great success elsewhere.

SUSTAIN FORWARD PRESENCE: We have very limited permanent presence in this region. Port visits, combined exercises, and visits by general and flag officers play an important role in maintaining our relationships and influence. Security assistance in all its forms strengthens our interaction with the nations of this region. Military contacts and exercises have a powerful shaping effect and often provide access to infrastructure essential for operations.

RESPOND

USEUCOM responds to NCA direction across the spectrum of operations. While there is still peace to preserve, we exercise force deployment options to make a potential aggressor understand the costs of an action he appears to be contemplating. We assert the rights of the international community when we conduct freedom of navigation operations. We conduct Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEOs) to protect the lives of Americans and third country nationals in both permissive and non-permissive environments. We conduct humanitarian missions to rectify situations that threaten to cause a large loss of life before other agencies can take action. We conduct the whole spectrum of peace operations, and we are prepared to conduct a Major Theater War in our own theater or support its conduct in another.

Respond is the primary reason for USEUCOM's high OPTEMPO. Often it supports the objective of *support peace and stability*; sometimes it *defeats adversaries* by applying U.S. military power against actions endangering our interests.

In all cases, we will attempt to complete our action in the shortest feasible time. Commitment of U.S. forces to a crisis normally detracts from their training and readiness; consumes resources; and limits flexibility and speed of response elsewhere.



SMALLER SCALE CONTINGENCIES (SSC):

Smaller scale contingencies take many forms. In some cases, our actions are purely to relieve human suffering resulting from either natural or man-made disasters. The NCA sometimes direct the commitment of USEUCOM forces when significant loss of life threatens to happen so quickly that no other agency can respond in time without our help, and where a reasonable degree of security for our committed forces can be assured. Sometimes USEUCOM forces lead such an operations; more often, our logistic, intelligence, and communications capabilities support other governmental and non-governmental agencies.

NEOs are a special kind of humanitarian mission in that they are designed to preserve American lives or the lives of third country nationals. USEUCOM and embassy country teams plan and conduct these operations with the closest cooperation. They differ from other humanitarian missions also because we always conduct them in an unfriendly (though sometimes permissive) environment and because the application of military force is more likely to be required. Speed, planning, organization, specially trained forces, and a high degree of flexibility are all required for successful NEOs. Although they can be complex and very demanding, they tend to be of relatively short duration, and usually do not tie up critical resources for a long time.

Peace operations of all sorts do tend to tie up critical resources for a long time. This is because military objectives that achieve the stated political goals are hard to define, and because the desired political end state often requires processes that advance slowly. In addition, peace operations frequently produce asymmetric situations — we are likely to be opposed by actors very deeply committed to their cause.

Experience has taught us several principles that are useful in conducting all these Smaller Scale Contingencies:

CLEARLY DEFINE MEASURABLE POLITICAL AND MILITARY OBJECTIVES THAT WILL LEAD TO THE DESIRED MILITARY AND POLITICAL END STATE. This can be very difficult. There may be no enemy in a conventional sense. In a humanitarian crisis, the real “enemy” may be disease or deprivation, or even the breakdown of institutions necessary to support civil society. When there is an enemy in the usual sense, his actual military force will conceal its very existence to the extent it can, and is likely to employ force in ways that make a straight-forward military response difficult. Furthermore, in peace operations, the relation between achievement of a particular military objective and the desired political end cannot be fully known in advance, especially since, in many cases, limited time will be available to analyze the situation. It is all the more important that we establish clear, measurable objectives, particularly if we confront an astute adversary, since the first point of his own strategy will be to cause us to lose sight of them. Achieving those objectives becomes the start point for transition to normal shaping activities.

PURSUE MISSIONS THAT ONLY MILITARY FORCES CAN ACCOMPLISH; ONCE THEY ARE ACCOMPLISHED, REMOVE THE FORCE. In relation to the scale and urgency of possible missions to be accomplished, our military forces are among our most scarce national resources. It makes sense to employ them only when alternatives are lacking, and to withdraw them from a crisis as soon as they have established the conditions for other agencies to be effective. Exit strategies must be an integral part of operational planning and must be clearly tied to attaining objectives. They must lead to the beginning or resumption of normal “shaping” activities.

ONCE FORCES ARE COMMITTED TO A MISSION, PREVENT “MISSION CREEP.” Incremental mission creep should be avoided. Even if the mission is precisely defined, actual contact with a situation will reveal a whole range of additional ways for us to do more. Experience shows that succumbing to the temptation to do more often leads to disaster. There are many governmental and non-governmental organizations better equipped to accomplish non-military missions than are USEUCOM forces, and we establish Civil-Military Operations Centers to coordinate the activities of these organizations with our own. As a rule of thumb, we will not change the mission of an engaged force unless, after consultation with and direction from the highest-level decision makers, we do so in a well-considered and significant way. Ideally, when committing a force, we identify in advance conditions that will cause us to reevaluate our objectives. If we envision transitioning to another mission, e.g., peacekeeping to peace enforcement, we must make a fresh assessment to ensure the force commander is given resources appropriately sized and organized to accomplish his new mission.

EMPLOY DECISIVE FORCE. We want to make sure our capability to conduct dominant maneuver and precision engagement is so apparent that resistance is clearly futile. This is the key component of force sizing. At the same time, we ensure that the force at points of contact is a purely combat force to the extent possible—this facilitates force protection and reduces the forward logistics requirement. We pursue our objectives aggressively to accomplish the mission as quickly as is feasible, thereby increasing the likelihood of success, conserving resources, improving force protection, and releasing forces as soon as possible for redeployment and reconstitution.

MAJOR THEATER WAR (MTW):

The National Military Strategy sees large-scale, cross-border aggression as a challenge in the Arabian Gulf region and in Northeast Asia. CINCEUR would be a “supporting” CINC should conflict(s) develop in these regions. For that reason, our units maintain the highest possible level of readiness for conventional conflict, even while conducting other operations. U.S. armor units in both the IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia, for example, conducted tank gunnery training even while conducting their demanding peace keeping mission. We maintain the training and logistic facilities to rapidly reconstitute and retrain units transitioning from an SSC to an MTW. Deploying USEUCOM and other forces to MTWs requires effective infrastructure in USEUCOM’s AOR. In conjunction with TRANSCOM we systematically define the requirements and take action to ensure we can meet them. Finally, USEUCOM can also provide a training and staging base for units deploying from the CONUS to the CENTCOM AOR.

We also note that of the three MTWs in the last fifty years, two were not expected even one week before the “large-scale cross-border aggression occurred.” USEUCOM maintains the capability to *respond* rapidly to such aggression anywhere in its area of responsibility on short notice.

PREPARE

The role of national agencies in „preparing for an uncertain future“ is primary. Only national agencies can marshal the enormous financial and technological resources necessary to develop and build new equipment; only they can assemble global experience into a coherent national doctrine. At the same time, the role of the unified commands, although secondary, is still crucial. They

can best see what technological development will provide the most operational benefit; they learn the new doctrine and use the new equipment in the real world and experience the success or failure of both; and in training and operations, they actively develop and try new concepts.

The CINC has several key forums and tools with which to influence the allocation of defense resources. His Integrated Priority List (IPL) has a function embedded in law and provides a prioritized list of the command's top warfighting requirements. His Joint Monthly Readiness Report (JMRR) assesses theater needs against current and projected mission scenarios, and his annual testimony before Congress gives him a forum to present theater perspectives. His most powerful resource however, is his interface with the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). The CINC meets with the JROC twice annually in meetings that provide a forum with the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and an interchange between the USEUCOM and Joint Staffs. USEUCOM also reports operational needs back to national agencies through numerous other channels.

USEUCOM plays an important role in two important aspects of technological development—we have executive agency for significant aspects of Defense Cooperation in Armaments (DCA) through which we develop hardware with our allies. This brings larger resources, including a larger technological base, to bear on a given system development project. It can produce economies of scale during production, and assures the highest level of interoperability in the field. We are also the operational sponsor for important Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs); through this sponsorship we help explore the most efficient ways to apply already available (or nearly available) technology to urgent operational needs.

The specifications for most of the equipment coming „on line“ today were written at least a decade ago; we report on whether the capabilities are still relevant, normally through the components, but sometimes directly. Revolutionary military effects though, are achieved by *combining* technology with doctrine. In the simplest terms, a new tool is helpful only if you know how to use it. Sometimes we simultaneously try out new technology and help refine the doctrine that goes with it, as we are doing with Total Asset Visibility (TAV) in logistics. Furthermore, we participate actively in the development of joint doctrine, and formally review all joint doctrinal publications. We report both technical and doctrinal experience to the national level through the Joint Universal Lessons Learned System.

Finally, the pressure of operations often leads to the rapid development and implementation of important new concepts. This has happened with standing joint task forces. Such *ad hoc* development is certainly not formal, and it is conducted with the resources at hand and with limited time—but it has the virtue of always being single-mindedly focused on a real mission, and can often achieve highly effective results in a short period of time.

USEUCOM has made „Implement *Joint Vision 2010*“ an objective because we understand that the command can only be effective to the extent that it implements the outcome of national processes. At the same time, we participate in those processes aggressively since we know that they can never be very successful without the active influence of the unified commands.

STRATEGIC CONCEPTS

USEUCOM forces exemplify the strategic concepts enumerated by the *National Military Strategy*—*strategic agility, overseas presence, power projection, and decisive force*.

STRATEGIC AGILITY

The *National Military Strategy* defines strategic agility as the “timely concentration and employment of U.S. military power anywhere at our own initiative at a speed and tempo that our adversaries cannot match.” To be prepared to do this, USEUCOM forces are continually executing a long-range program to maintain readiness. At the same time, they conduct numerous engagement activities, that they usually plan in advance, and execute many Smaller Scale Contingencies (SSCs), that almost always cannot be planned in advance. The consequence is that USEUCOM forces practice strategic agility daily. During training, they must be ready for operational deployment on short notice. While conducting peace enforcement operations, they continue to execute training on basic battle skills. In engagement activities, they enhance such readiness factors as regional expertise and knowledge of the forces of likely allies in conflict. To ensure that adequate command and control is available even for multiple simultaneous operations, the Command maintains and routinely trains seven Joint Task Force Headquarters. Six of them have recently conducted operations.

OVERSEAS PRESENCE

USEUCOM’s overseas presence powerfully supports both *Shape* and *Respond* elements of national strategy. Our permanently stationed and temporarily and rotationally deployed forces convince aggressors of our intentions. They strengthen and reassure allies. They create multinational military competencies of the highest order, and underscore our commitment to the peaceful resolution of the inevitable conflicts among friends and allies. Because overseas forces can respond quickly, they control crises before they become conflicts. And they show, through

both their instruction and their example, the proper role of highly capable military organizations in a democratic society.

POWER PROJECTION

Overseas presence gives us an excellent position from which to respond to crises. Nevertheless, USEUCOM's AOR measures north to south roughly two and one-half times the distance across the entire United States. *Intratheater* power projection often requires strategic assets. For many of our operations, e.g., for NEOs, power projection requires simultaneous deployment and employment of our capabilities. Furthermore, USEUCOM is a force provider in many important scenarios, and, because of its infrastructure, an enabler for forces deploying from the U.S. to other AORs.

To meet power projection challenges, USEUCOM works closely with other geographic unified commands, and with TRANSCOM.

DECISIVE FORCE

As described more fully in the *Respond* section of this chapter, USEUCOM seeks to present adversaries with a force array that makes their resistance clearly futile. Our aim is to establish the military end state specified by the NCA very rapidly and with a minimum of collateral damage and loss of life so that the critically important process of winning the peace can commence.

VI. RESOURCES

INTRODUCTION

We require resources every day to carry out our strategic concepts and achieve our objectives. Those resources are discussed below in the categories of *Forces*, *Funding*, and *Infrastructure*.

Such resources are effective only with the aid of less tangible resources which USEUCOM and the U.S. in general have in our AOR. The trust and confidence that we enjoy with most of the nations and peoples of this AOR are critical enablers for both our military and political effectiveness. They were built over decades by actions that consistently demonstrated our capability, reliability, responsibility, and respect for the rights and national interests of others. Such resources have in their turn led to the development of other kinds of long-term resources—military competencies, well established working relationships, host nation and international institutions—that are equally critical to the USEUCOM mission. Decisions about *Forces*, *Funding*, and *Infrastructure* that do not both use and enhance these other resources can be very expensive in the long term.

High quality equipment is a hallmark of American forces. It is not discussed below because providing it is a service responsibility. But, as discussed under the Strategic Concept of *Prepare*, above, USEUCOM and the other unified commands make crucially important inputs to the acquisition cycle.

Forces, Funding, and Infrastructure are very different sorts of resources but adequate amounts of all three are required to effectively support the command.

FORCES

USEUCOM force structure must be adequate to implement our strategic concepts. Manning that force structure in turn dictates European Troop Strength requirements. USEUCOM is a total force, and integrates the unique contributions of active, reserve, and civilian components.

Force decisions in USEUCOM have two parts. We must decide: first, what force structure is required to execute the strategic concepts; and second, what proportions of that force should be permanently stationed, rotationally deployed, or temporarily assigned.

Force Structure

The strategic concepts of *shape* and *respond* generate the requirements for the USEUCOM force structure.

Respond: The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan and the U.S. response to NATO's Defense Planning Questionnaire are the primary force structure drivers for USEUCOM. *Respond* requires the ability to form on short notice a capable, interoperable, joint task force for commitment to an MTW in the AOR or elsewhere. Reinforcing an existing structure already in the command is many times faster than reconstructing an organization that at the start of the crisis has major pieces missing. It is important that we continue our force contributions to NATO at approximately the current level. The present number of operations, and the dangers of a future that is still uncertain, make this a necessity. Furthermore, at a time when NATO adaptation requires decisions that will have impact for decades, American leadership is vital; that leadership is secured by our contribution to the Alliance's military capability.

Respond also requires that USEUCOM respond to crises throughout the AOR as directed by the NCA. These SSCs put tremendous stress on USEUCOM forces. There is little indication that these requirements will decrease in the future, and there is a real chance that they will increase. SSCs will demand continued assessments of our requirement for assigned force structure, while at the same time placing heavier support burdens on our augmenting forces.

Shape: Although the impact of this concept is large, the force structure dedicated exclusively to shaping activities is an extremely small portion of European Troop Strength. Engagement exercises can be manpower intensive but are of short duration and are typically conducted by in-theater response forces with augmentation from the reserve components. Small groups of staff officers at the embassies and on headquarters staffs manage Security Assistance. The Joint Contact Team is manned primarily by teams on temporary orders and individual reservists on temporary active duty. The Marshall Center has a permanent staff of under 200 personnel, and the German government pays a significant number of these.

Force Mix

Once we have defined the force levels that provide the required capability, we analyze how they should be apportioned among permanently assigned, rotational, temporarily deployed, and reserve component forces.

PERMANENTLY ASSIGNED FORCES: Stationing units overseas is more costly than basing similar units in the United States. The increased cost of overseas-

based units brings a large return: faster reaction time in theater; much greater understanding of the AOR; ability to conduct *shape* activities; political impact; and availability to conduct multinational exercises without using strategic lift. Extremely high OPTEMPO indicates that the European Troop Strength of approximately 100,000 represents the minimum force—and infrastructure—necessary to achieve our U.S. security objectives in theater.

The current level of U.S. permanently-stationed forces in the USEUCOM AOR is the minimum level required to execute the strategy—they are required to achieve the influence and access required by our *National Security Strategy*. We simply could not accomplish our objectives without the continuity, theater expertise, and long-term relationships forward stationed forces provide. In addition to all other benefits, they convincingly demonstrate America's enduring commitment to the region.

ROTATIONALLY AND TEMPORARILY DEPLOYED FORCES: Rotational task groups comprise the bulk of USEUCOM's naval forces. Naval forces in the Mediterranean play key roles in both *shaping* and *responding* in our AOR. They can also reach the Red Sea to conduct Southwest Asia strike operations nine days faster than those on the East coast of CONUS. Although the forces are rotational, their effectiveness is greatly enhanced by the fact that the naval component, Sixth Fleet, and naval installation staffs are permanently stationed in theater. Other Services rotationally deploy forces from their Active and Reserve Components as well. Prolonged Smaller Scale Contingencies require a force base larger than USEUCOM, and for the latter stages of these both active and reserve forces are often temporarily deployed from CONUS.

RESERVE COMPONENT FORCES: The Reserve Components are an essential participant in the full range of military operations in this theater. USEUCOM could not sustain its current level of operations without access to the units and personnel of the Reserve Components. In many cases, required capabilities for short notice operations are available only in the Reserve Components. When a Reserve Component provides assistance, individual and unit proficiency is excellent. Missions are accomplished to a high standard. Both reserve and active temporarily assigned forces support the Joint Contact Team Program, exercises, and Operation Joint Endeavor, to name just a few. For USEUCOM, a capable Reserve Component is an essential resource.

FUNDING

USEUCOM's funding provides the dollars required for daily USEUCOM shaping and responding activities. USEUCOM components, working through the Services and the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System, request the funding

they need to meet their responsibilities for readiness—providing an adequate quality of life for Service members and their families; maintaining force readiness through training, logistic support and maintenance; and conducting routine operations. Some engagement activities, such as exercises, are also funded partially through the same mechanism; some, such as security assistance, are funded through an interagency process; and some, such as traditional CINC activities, are funded by separate line items in the President's budget.

Our *respond* activities provide a special funding challenge. These operations are usually unforeseen, and therefore not budgeted; as a consequence, we mortgage our training program to provide money to conduct urgent operations until supplemental funding can be provided. We strongly support a funding mechanism that pays for contingency operations without simultaneously putting at risk ongoing programs necessary to achieve our near-term readiness and longer-term strategic objectives. Although Congress has generally supported such *ad hoc* operational expenditures by reimbursement, delays inherent in the legislative process cause disruption to the training program and could ultimately cause serious damage to our combat readiness. Funds received late in the fiscal year cannot restore missed training opportunities at major facilities.

INFRASTRUCTURE

Both *shaping* and *responding* activities require an enormous power projection capability. Current initiatives may reduce our requirement for infrastructure by achieving efficiencies, but they can not eliminate it. Infrastructure costs money and tends to generate contentious issues with our friends and allies. But it is essential. Unless we already have basing infrastructure and host nation support in place, our inability to support will limit our ability to act.

USEUCOM's infrastructure has three vital functions. It provides support for the troops stationed overseas and their families; it provides logistic support for units conducting training and shaping activities; and it provides a foundation for operations in theater and for onward movement to a MTW in Southwest Asia. The current distribution of infrastructure is based on the requirements for unique sites such as Grafenwoehr's Combined Arms Training Center, the consolidation of troops and family members near the most modern housing and services, and the need for geographic distribution within the theater.